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CRISCI V. SECURITY INSURANCE Co.:
THE DAWN OF THE MODERN ERA
OF INSURANCE: BAD FAITH AND
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
Jeffrey E. Thomas*
I have chosen Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.' as "my favorite insurance
case" for this symposium issue because it typifies the doctrine of "bad faith,"
one of the most interesting and important contributions of insurance law to the
general body of law. It "typifies" the doctrine with its classic, if somewhat
extreme, fact pattern,2 and with its reliance on the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing3 for the recognition of a cause of action that sounds in
tort.4 Yet it also represents a potential for bad faith law that has not yet been
fulfilled: the promise of emotional distress damages for an insurer's failure to
settle.
I take this opportunity to explore both what Crisci has contributed and
what it may still contribute. I will begin with a brief overview of the case itself,
followed by an analysis of its historical contribution to bad faith law generally.
I will then turn to the issue of emotional distress to describe how courts have
responded to Crisci on that issue, and to make a normative argument that emo-
tional distress damages should be routinely available in bad faith cases.
I. THE CASE ITSELF
A. The Facts
The facts of Crisci are not complicated. Rosina Crisci owned an apart-
ment building and purchased $10,000 worth of general liability insurance from
Security Insurance Company. One of Mrs. Crisci's tenants, June DiMare, was
descending an exterior wooden staircase when it gave way, causing her to fall
through the opening to her waist and to hang some fifteen feet above the
ground for a period of time. Mrs. DiMare suffered physical injuries from the
* Tiera M. Farrow Faculty Scholar and Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri,
Kansas City. I wish to thank Lawrence Machachlan, Nancy Morgan, and John M. Lyon for
their research assistance.
I Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
2 I doubt a law professor could hypothesize any better set of facts to justify imposition of
bad faith liability.
3 426 P.2d at 176.
4 Id. at 178. The case made the tort basis for the claim clearer and more explicit. See infra
text accompanying notes 64-70.
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incident, and afterwards experienced a very severe psychosis requiring hospi-
talization. She sued Crisci seeking $400,000 in damages.5
Security Insurance Company provided Crisci with a defense under a reser-
vation of rights. It retained an experienced and competent attorney who han-
dled the case with the aid of investigators and a claims manager.6 The attorney
reported that the case was one in which liability was clear, and that the verdict
might be very large if the psychosis could be attributed to the incident at the
apartment building. As the case developed, both sides found expert medical
testimony to support their positions. The claims manager noted that the cause
of the psychosis would be a question for the jury, but that if the jury believed
plaintiffs expert, the damages could reach $150,000. The attorney essentially
agreed, though he set the exposure at $100,000. 7
DiMare eventually offered to settle for the $10,000 policy limits. By this
time, however, Security was convinced that it could establish through its expert
that the psychosis was not caused by the incident. As a result, Security would
offer no more than $3000 to settle the case. DiMare lowered her offer to
$9000, and Crisci was willing to contribute $2500 of her own money to a set-
tlement, but Security rejected that offer.8
The jury returned a verdict of $100,000 for DiMare and $1000 for her
husband. This verdict was sustained on appeal.9 Security then paid its $10,000
policy limits. Although it is unclear whether the remaining $91,000 of the
judgment was satisfied by a settlement,' ° or whether DiMare executed on the
judgment, 1 Crisci was left essentially destitute. The California Supreme Court
summarized her condition:
Mrs. Crisci, an immigrant widow of 70, became indigent. She worked as a babysit-
ter, and her grandchildren paid her rent. The change in her financial condition was
accompanied by a decline in physical health, hysteria, and suicide attempts. 12
B. The Holding and Analysis
In the action brought by Crisci, the trial court awarded $91,000 plus inter-
ests and costs for the excess of the DiMare judgment over the policy limits, and
an additional $25,000 for Crisci's emotional distress damages.' 3 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding of bad faith, but reversed
the emotional distress damages. The California Court of Appeals held that the
5 Id. at 175.
6 Some of these facts come from the opinion of the California Court of Appeals. Crisci v.
Sec. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 288, 289 (Ct. App. 1966), vacated by, 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
7 Id.
I See id. at 289-90.
9 Id. at 290.
10 According to the California Supreme Court's account: "A settlement was arranged by
which the DiMares received $22,000, a 40 percent interest in Mrs. Crisci's claim to a partic-
ular piece of property, and an assignment of Mrs. Crisci's cause of action against Security."
Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967).
11 According to the California Court of Appeals: "Mrs. DiMare satisfied a portion of her
judgment by execution and sale of respondent's property and stripped her of all her material
possessions." 52 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
12 426 P.2d at 176.
'3 Id. at 175.
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bad faith claim was based on contract, not tort, and that the contract claim
could not support an award of emotional distress damages. 4 The California
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on both bad faith and emotional distress
damages. 
15
C. Bad Faith
As to the bad faith issue, the California Supreme Court essentially fol-
lowed the case of Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. 16 The court
found, pursuant to Comunale, that the Security policy included an "implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party [would] do anything
which [would] injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agree-
ment."" 7 In light of this implied covenant, Security had the duty to "give the
interests of the insured at least as much consideration as it gives to its own
interests" when evaluating a settlement offer.' 8 The test for determining
whether Security had fulfilled its duty was "whether a prudent insurer without
policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer."1 9
Applying this test, the California Supreme Court found that the settlement
offer should have been accepted. Both Security's claims adjuster and the
retained attorney recognized that the case could result in a verdict of at least
$100,000, far above the $10,000 policy limits. Although Security believed that
the verdict would be much lower in reliance on expert testimony that the psy-
chosis was not caused by the accident, a trier of fact could find that this belief
was unreasonable. 2" DiMare had reputable psychiatrists who would testify to
her theory of causation, and Security had been told that the issue was so close
"that in a group of 24 psychiatrists, 12 could be found to support each side."
2
'
The California Supreme Court concluded:
The trial court found that defendant "knew that there was a considerable risk of
substantial recovery beyond said policy limits" and that "the defendant did not give
as much consideration to the financial interests of its said insured as it gave to its own
interests." That is all that was required. The award of $91,000 must therefore be
affirmed.2 2
In the course of discussing this issue, the California Supreme Court clari-
fied the legal standard for bad faith. The court noted that "bad faith" did not
require evidence of "dishonesty, fraud, and concealment."2 3 Although some
" See 52 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The California Court of Appeals noted that emotional distress
damages might be available for breaches of contracts that "concerned the comfort, happiness
and welfare of one of the parties," but found that the Security insurance policy was not such
a contract. Id.
15 Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179.
16 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
17 Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 178.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 176.
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cases had language that could be construed to require such evidence,24 a careful
reading of those cases and Communale showed that liability was based not on a
"bad faith breach of the contract but for failure to meet the duty to accept
reasonable settlements.
25
The California Supreme Court toyed with, but ultimately did not adopt, a
rule of strict liability for bad faith refusal to settle. In support of this proposed
rule, the court noted that it might be consistent with policyholder expecta-
tions,26 and that such a rule would be simple to apply.2  In addition, a rule of
strict liability would promote justice because "in this situation where the
insurer's and insured's interests necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may
reap the benefits of its determination not to settle, should also suffer the detri-
ments of its decision." 28  Nevertheless, the court did not adopt the rule (or
weigh possible countervailing considerations) because the evidence was
"clearly sufficient to support the determination that Security breached its duty
to consider the interests of Mrs. Crisci in proposed settlements."
29
D. Emotional Distress Damages
Unlike the California Court of Appeals, which reversed on the emotional
distress issue, the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of
emotional distress damages. The court reasoned that the cause of action
sounded both in tort and contract. 30 Fundamentally, the court found "that an
injured party should be compensated for all damage proximately caused by the
wrongdoer. '3 The goal of compensating tort victims justifies allowing victims
to recover "for all detriment caused whether it could have been anticipated or
not."'32 The court then broadly applied the tort rule for emotional distress dam-
ages. Noting that emotional distress damages are available for plaintiffs who
also suffer personal injury or interference with property rights, the court
extended the rule to those who lose their property and suffer emotional dis-
tress.3 3 The court concluded: "No substantial reason exists to distinguish the
24 The court cited Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1965);
Palmer v. Financial Indemnity Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Ct. App. 1963); and Davy v. Public
National Insurance Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Ct. App. 1960).
25 Crisci, 426 P.2d at 177.
26 The Crisci court explained:
[In light of the common knowledge that settlement is one of the usual methods by which an
insured receives protection under a liability policy, it may not be unreasonable for an insured
who purchases a policy with limits to believe that a sum of money equal to the limits is available
and will be used so as to avoid liability....
Id.
27 "The proposed rule is a simple one to apply and avoids the burdens of a determination
whether a settlement offer within the policy limits was reasonable." Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 In making this point, the California Supreme Court clarified that the claim is not one
sounding solely in contract law. See id. at 178 n.3.
31 Id. at 178.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 179. Professor John Bauman noted that the cases relied upon for allowing emo-
tional distress damages were not very convincing. John H. Bauman, Emotional Distress
Damages and the Tort of Insurance Bad Faith, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 717, 738 (1998).
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cases which have permitted recovery for mental distress in actions for invasion
of property rights" from those involving loss of property.34
The California Supreme Court also addressed the principle policy objec-
tions to allowing emotional distress damages. Those objections were identified
as the risk of false claims and the possibility of litigation over trivial claims.3 5
The court found that those concerns were minimized by the fact that the bad
faith conduct of the insurer had caused substantial economic damages apart
from the emotional distress.36
The court limited the availability of emotional distress damages to the
insurance context. It noted that "[r]ecovery of damages for mental suffering in
the instant case does not mean that in every case of breach of contract the
injured party may recover such damages. ' 37 The insurance context was distin-
guished from other contract situations by the fact that the insurer had a tort duty
to settle as well as a contractual duty, and by the fact that one of the purposes of
insurance was to protect against this kind of mental distress. The court found:
Among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are well
aware, is the peace of mind and security it will provide in the event of an accidental
loss, and recovery of damages for mental suffering has been permitted for breach of
contracts which directly concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem of one of
the parties.
38
II. HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTION
The California Supreme Court's opinion in Crisci made a substantial con-
tribution to the development of modern bad faith law. Although the historical
roots of bad faith law may be traced back some fifty years prior to the Crisci
decision,3 9 the California Supreme Court opinion "popularized" the doctrine to
the point that liability for an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle within policy
limits has now become the majority rule.' In addition, the Crisci opinion
helped to establish that the cause of action was based on the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, sounded in tort rather than contract, and that one
way to assess bad faith was whether an insurer would accept the settlement
offer if its policy had no limits. Each of these contributions will be considered
in turn.
31 Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. (citing Chelini v. Nieri, 196 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1948)).
31 See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1990). Professor
(now Dean) Syverud traces the doctrine back to 1915-16. See id. at 1116 n.4.
40 As one commentator notes, "Virtually all jurisdictions that have considered the matter
have concluded that the insurer, in deciding how to respond to a policy limits settlement
offer, owes the insured some kind of duty to consider his interests." STEPHEN S. ASHLEY,
BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 2:04, at 2-7 (2d ed. 1997). "The majority
of courts have expressed the insurer's duty to the insured in responding to settlement offers
in terms of good faith rather than due care." Id. § 2:05, at 2-9. See also JEFFREY W. STEM-
PEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DIsUrTES Ch. 10 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2002) (citing
Crisci in three of seven sections in the chapter).
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A. Crisci Popularized Bad Faith Law
One way to gage the influence of the Crisci decision is to see how often it
has been cited. By this measure, its impact is very significant. It has been cited
in more than 300 court opinions,4 ' including 91 opinions by the states' highest
courts," and 26 opinions of the United States Courts of Appeal.4 3 It has also
been cited in more than 100 law review articles,' and when bar journals and
other professionally-oriented publications are included, the number of articles
citing the case more than doubles.4 5
The sheer number of citations is significant in its own right, but the influ-
ence of Crisci can also be seen by these numbers in comparison to citations of
other important bad faith cases. For example, one of the earliest bad faith opin-
ions from a state supreme court is Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance
Co.,4 6 decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1930. In that case the court
held that an automobile insurer was liable for the excess judgment because it
failed to make reasonable efforts to settle the case.47 The insurer acted unrea-
sonably by failing to fully investigate liability in the case, and by offering only
$1500 of a $5000 policy limit. The plaintiff's damages were serious enough
that a verdict in excess of the policy limits was likely, but her lawyer suggested
that his client would agree to settle for $2500 or $3000.48
Compared to Crisci, this landmark case,4 9 which had an additional thirty
years to accumulate citations, had only about one-third as many citations in
41 I ran the search "Crisci /s Sentry" in the "Federal and State Federal Cases after 1944"
library in Lexis database on October 17, 2001. It found 346 cases. I spot-checked a number
of the cases, and they consistently were citing to Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 426 P.2d
173 (Cal. 1967). The same search run in the Westlaw All Cases after 1944 library and found
345 cases on October 17, 2001.
42 The search "Crisci s Sentry" in the "Highest Court, All States" library of the Lexis
database found ninety-one cases. Although many of the cases were from the Supreme Court
of California, the highest court in twenty-nine other states had cited Crisci. High Courts
from the following states cited Crisci: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
43 1 ran the search "Crisci /s Sentry" in the "U.S. Courts of Appeal Cases - All Circuits"
library of the Lexis database. It found twenty-six cases. Although many of the cases were
from the Ninth Circuit (which includes California), the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits also cited Crisci.
4' The search "Crisci s Sentry" found 127 articles in the "Law Reviews, Combined" library
of the Lexis database on October 17, 2001.
15 The search "Crisci /s Sentry" found 292 articles in the "Journals and Law Reviews Com-
bined" database of Westlaw on October 17, 2001.
46 Hilker v. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 N.W. 257 (Wis. 1930), affid on rehearing, 235 N.W. 413
(Wis. 1931).
47 Id. at 260-61. The court used an agency theory to justify its holding. It found that an
agent has a duty to protect the interests of its principle, and therefore that the insurer, as an
agent of the insured, had an obligation to reasonably perform the defense and potential set-
tlement of the case. See id. at 259.
48 See id. at 260.
49 At one point Ashley notes: "In the first edition of this book I credited the Hilker court
with establishing the modem tort of bad faith. Upon further reflection I have concluded that
the importance of this case can also be seen from its relationship to Crisci." See ASHLEY,
supra note 40, § 2:09, at 2-27. Although not directly relied upon by Crisci, Hilker was
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cases, 50 and only about one-fourth as many citations in law reviews. 5' The
difference is smaller in citations by the highest state courts, though Crisci was
still cited more often. Hilker was cited in sixty-three opinions of the highest
state courts, 52 compared to ninety-one for Crisci. Thus, by comparison
Crisci's contribution was substantial.
Another interesting case for comparison is Comunale v. Traders & Gen-
eral Insurance Co. 5 3 That case, decided in 1958, was the first in which the
California Supreme Court held that an insurer could be liable beyond its policy
limits for bad faith refusal to settle, and was relied upon by the same court in
Crisci.5 4 In Comunale, the insurer refused to defend or settle a case brought by
a pedestrian who was hit by a truck. The insurer maintained that there was no
coverage because the truck did not belong to the driver. During the trial, the
plaintiff offered to settle for $4000, well below the policy limits of $10,000, but
the insurer refused, continuing to rely on its coverage position.55 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, relying in part on Hilker,56 found that the insurance policy
included an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that the
insurer, pursuant to that covenant, had a duty to consider the insured's interest
in accepting a proposed settlement. The court held that,
an insurer, who wrongfully declines to defend and who refuses to accept a reasonable
settlement within the policy limits in violation of its duty to consider in good faith the
interest of the insured in the settlement, is liable for the entire judgment against the
insured even if it exceeds the policy limits.
57
As the first pronouncement of the doctrine of bad faith by the California
Supreme Court, Comunale was widely cited and discussed, but comparison of
relied upon by the California Supreme Court in Communale v. Traders & General Insurance
Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (Cal. 1958), which in turn was relied upon by Crisci. See Crisci
v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176-77 (Cal. 1967).
50 A search on October 19, 2001, of the "Federal and State Federal Cases after 1944" library
in Lexis using "Hilker Is Western" revealed 101 cases.
51 A search of the Lexis "Law Reviews, Combined" library revealed citations in thirty arti-
cles on October 19, 2001.
52 The search "Hilker s Western" in the "Highest Court, All States" library of the Lexis
database found sixty-three cases on October 19, 2001. Those cases included opinions from
twenty-five states other than Wisconsin, which is pretty close to the number of states in
which Crisci was cited by the highest court (twenty-eight states). High courts from the
following states cited Hilker: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
The states citing to Crisci but not to Hilker include: Alaska, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. The states citing to Hilker but not to Crisci
include: Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
51 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
5" See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176-77. Comunale was also instrumental in linking bad faith
claims to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see ASHtLEY, supra note 40,
§ 2:07-2:08, and, in Ashley's view "deserves a large share of the glory" for creating the
cause of action, along with Hilker, see id. § 2:09, at 2-27 n.47.
55 See Comunale, 328 P.2d at 200.
56 See id. at 200-01.
57 Id. at 202.
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citations shows that Crisci, decided nine years later, was roughly as influential.
Both cases have been cited in hundreds of opinions, though Comunale was
cited in fifty-nine more overall.58 In the highest state courts, the number of
citations was virtually the same, with only one additional citation to
Comunale.59 Crisci was somewhat more influential in the academic literature.
It was cited in twenty-seven more articles than Comunale.6 ° Although this
comparison does not favor Crisci as much as the comparison to Hilker, it none-
theless shows that Crisci was a very influential opinion.
B. Crisci Contributed to the Doctrinal Development of Bad Faith Law
Another way to consider the influence of Crisci is with respect to particu-
lar doctrinal developments in bad faith law. The opinion in Crisci helped to
establish that the claim for bad faith refusal to settle was based on the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, sounded in tort, and could be evaluated
by consideration of whether the insurer would have accepted the settlement if
the policy limits did not apply.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Comunale was the turning
point that established the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the
basis for a bad faith refusal to settle claim.6" That has become the predominant
basis for bad faith liability.6" Crisci continued the trend by expressly relying
on the implied covenant, and because it was widely cited in support of the
58 The search "Comunale s Traders" found 405 cases in the "Federal and State Federal
Cases after 1944" library in Lexis on October 19, 2001, compared to 346 cases citing Crisci.
See supra note 41.
19 The search "Comunale s Traders" found ninety-two cases in the "Highest Court, All
States" library of the Lexis database on October 19, 2001, compared to ninety-one citing to
Crisci. See supra note 42. The ninety-two opinions citing to Comunale came from the
highest court of thirty different states outside of California, compared to opinions of the
highest court from twenty-nine states citing to Crisci. See supra note 42. The highest courts
from Alaska, Iowa, Louisiana, Ohio, and West Virginia cited to Crisci but not to Comunale.
The highest courts from Maryland, Missouri, New Mexico, Tennessee, Washington, and
Wisconsin cited to Comunale but not Crisci.
I considered the possibility that cases were simultaneously citing to both Crisci and
Comunale, but the search of "Comunale s Traders but not Crisci" in the "Highest Court, All
States" library of the Lexis database on October 24, 2001, found forty-nine cases. The
search of "Crisci s Security but not Comunale" in the same library on the same day found
forty-eight cases. Switching to the "Federal and State Federal Cases after 1944" library in
Lexis, I found 192 cases citing to Crisci, but not to Comunale using the search "Crisci s
Security but not Comunale" on October 24, 2001.
60 The search "Comunale /s Traders" found 100 articles in the "Law Reviews, Combined"
library of the Lexis database on October 19, 2001, compared to 127 articles from a similar
search for Crisci. See supra note 44. This difference grows to eighty articles when the
search was done in the Westlaw "Journals and Law Reviews Combined" database. The
search of "Comunale Is Traders" done on October 19, 2001, found 212 articles compared to
the 292 articles found on October 17, 2001, citing Crisci. See supra note 44.
61 See ASHLEY, supra note 40, § 2:07-2:09 (tracing the doctrine from Comunale through
Hilker and Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914)); see also ROBERT
H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 25G, at 154 (2d ed. 1996); STEMPEL,
supra note 40, § 10.03 (treating Crisci as more prominent case than Comunale).
62 See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25
SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 76-77 (1994); 2 THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5A.06
(2001).
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claim for bad faith refusal to settle, it helped to establish that the claim was
based on the implied covenant.
63
Crisci also helped to establish that the claim was one that sounded in
tort.' On this point, Crisci helped to clarify any ambiguity left by Comunale.
The court in Comunale relied on the contractual nature of the claim in order to
avoid the consequences of the shorter statute of limitations applicable to torts.
The court noted that a bad faith claim "has generally been treated as a tort," but
held that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff had the "free-
dom of election between an action of tort and one of contract. '65 As a result,
even though the statute of limitations had passed for a tort claim, the plaintiff
was not precluded from maintaining a bad faith claim as a matter of contract.
66
This reliance on the contract statute of limitations led some lower courts to
conclude that the claim sounded in contract rather than tort.67 Crisci unequivo-
cally corrected this view, noting that the claim sounded in both tort and con-
tract, and specifically disapproving cases that could be interpreted as holding
otherwise. 68 This helped to solidify the predominant view that the cause of
action sounds in tort.69 Many of the cases citing to Crisci follow its lead and
treat the claim as sounding in tort.7 °
A third substantive area in which Crisci has made a contribution concerns
the test to be applied in evaluating whether an insurer breached its duty. This is
one of the most difficult areas of bad faith law. Courts apply a wide range of
tests in deciding whether an insurer has acted in bad faith.71 Consequently,
Crisci's contribution in this area is more limited. Crisci applied a test that
63 See, e.g., Allen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751, 757-58 (N.D. 1980); Christian v. Am. Home Assur-
ance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1977); Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Prot. Mut. Ins.
Co., 375 A.2d 428, 429 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
64 One commentator noted that "it is common" to cite Crisci "as the leading case" establish-
ing tort liability for failure to settle. See Bauman, supra note 33, at 720 n.12. Accord
STEMPEL, supra note 40, at 10-17-10-19.
65 Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 203 (Cal. 1967).
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (Ct. App. 1965).
68 Crisci, 426 P.2d at 178.
69 See JERRY, supra note 61, § 25G, at 154-55; Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and
Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1139 n.5 (1954); Richmond, supra
note 62, at 80 ("Today, a tort cause of action for third-party bad faith is widely recog-
nized."); James M. Fisher, Should Advice of Counsel Constitute a Defense for Insurer Bad
Faith?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1447, 1448 (1994). For an excellent critique of the reliance on a
tort rather than contract, see Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Com-
ment on Bad Faith's Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (1994).
70 See, e.g., Twin City Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1180
(noting that "[m]any courts have recast the implied contractual duty of good faith settlement
as a tort duty"); Rogers v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879, 883 (S.D. Iowa 1982);
Chavers v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 4 (Ala. 1981); Taylor v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Ariz. 1996); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691
P.2d 1138, 1141 (Colo. 1984). See also supra note 64.
71 See ASHLEY, supra note 40, § 3:14 (courts have provided "little practical guidance on
precisely when an insurer must accept a settlement offer"); JERRY, supra note 61, §25G[2]
("[d]escriptions of what constitutes 'bad faith' conduct are diverse"); Richmond, supra note
62, at 96 ("'Bad faith' conduct defies uniform definition."). This doctrinal uncertainty has
existed for nearly fifty years. Professor (now Judge) Keeton noted in 1954 that "Courts have
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considered whether an insurer would have accepted the settlement if the policy
did not include any limit on liability.7 2 This test was first articulated and pro-
posed by Professor (now Judge) Keeton in his influential 1954 article.7 3
Although Crisci did not attribute the test to Keeton,74 its articulation of the test
was cited and relied upon by other courts.75 While this has not become a pre-
dominant rule for bad faith, it is one of the accepted ways of evaluating
whether an insurer acted in bad faith.76
Crisci's contribution in each of these three areas was significant, and helps
to demonstrate that it was a seminal opinion. The most groundbreaking part of
the Crisci opinion, however, was the decision to permit emotional distress
damages.7 7 While Crisci helped to explain and advance these various aspects
of bad faith law, it was the first decision to uphold emotional distress damages
for an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle. We now turn to an analysis of
Crisci's contribution to this particular doctrine.
III. CONTRIBUTION TO EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
It is difficult to gage Crisci's contribution for the availability of emotional
distress damages due to an insurer's bad faith conduct. Some observers tend to
treat Crisci as an isolated case in that it has done little to make emotional
distress damages more available.7 8 On the other hand, others have gone so far
disagreed regarding the standard used in defining this duty to settle." Keeton, supra note 69,
at 1139.
72 See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176.
73 See Keeton, supra note 69, at 1148.
7' The Crisci court cites to five court of appeals decisions, see Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176, none
of which articulate the test as one requiring consideration without the policy limits. The
characterization from Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1965),
is typical: "The insurer, in deciding whether a claim should be compromised, must take into
account the interest of the insured and give it at least as much consideration as it does to its
own interest." Id. at 404 (quoting Comunale, 328 P.2d at 200-01). It should be noted that
the Crisci court was aware of Keeton's article. See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 178 n.3 (citing
Keeton's article).
75 See, e.g., Cont'l Cas. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384, 387 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 792 P.2d 719, 723 (Ariz. 1990); Betts v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 543 (Ct. App. 1984); Trahan v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 219
So. 2d 187, 193 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
76 See ASHLEY, supra note 40, §§ 3:19-3:20; see also 7C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN
APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712, at 451 (text accompany-
ing note 55) (1997). For an example of cases endorsing or utilizing this approach, see Clear-
water, 792 P.2d at 723; Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 519 (Ct.
App. 1992); Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Iowa 1982).
7 As Professor Bauman notes:
The innovation of the Crisci case, then, was to transfer this familiar tort doctrine to a new basis -
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing - and to recognize that in
addition to the traditional contract remedy, the plaintiff could also recover damages for emo-
tional distress.
Bauman, supra note 33, at 739.
78 See, e.g., Kenneth Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's Liability for Bad Faith,
72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1302 n.30 (1994) (noting that "only a handful of reported cases" have
allowed non-economic damages); Syverud, supra note 39, at 1121 n.18 (emotional distress
damages are available in three states).
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as to state that a policyholder "may generally recover damages for emotional
distress caused by the insurer's misconduct. ' 79 Upon closer examination, it is
difficult to generalize about the case law allowing emotional distress damages.
Although a number of courts have allowed emotional distress damages, they
have relied upon various legal theories to justify such awards. These variations
make it more difficult to trace the influence of Crisci regarding this doctrine.
In the following subsection, I will outline the major theories used to permit
emotional distress damages in bad faith cases, and in the next subsection I will
consider the role that Crisci played in developing these theories.
A. Basis for Allowing Emotional Distress Damages
The availability of emotional distress damages is complicated by the varia-
tions in bad faith law. Although most courts have agreed that a party has a tort
claim for an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle,8° there are four different
approaches to bad faith for first party insurance claims: tort, contract,
expanded contract, and statutory. A substantial number of jurisdictions recog-
nize a tort claim for bad faith conduct in connection with first party insur-
ance,8" but a significant number have rejected the tort theory.82 Of those courts
rejecting the tort theory, some have permitted a contract theory with expanded
damages,8 3 while others have recognized a statutory cause of action.84 The
availability of emotional distress damages in the first party context is affected
by which of these approaches is used.
The availability of emotional distress damages is further complicated by
the possibility that the plaintiff might be able to recover under a related tort
claim even if emotional distress damages are not available for bad faith. Virtu-
ally all states recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,85
79 ASHLEY, supra note 40, § 8:04, at 8-10. Ashley cites to cases from twenty-one jurisdic-
tions to support this statement with respect to first-party insurance, and to cases from eight
jurisdictions to support this statement with respect to third-party insurance. He also cites
cases from seven jurisdictions that are contrary on this point. Id. at 8-10-8-13 nn.26-27.
80 See supra note 40.
8' Ashley finds that recent decisions "have tipped the scales decisively in favor of the first-
party tort and have clearly established it as the majority rule." ASHLEY, supra note 40,
§ 2:15, at 2-51. He notes that a "minority" has adopted the approach of Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973), while the "majority" have followed the somewhat
more stringent formula from Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis.
1978). See id. at 2-51 to 2-52.
82 Professor Jerry characterizes this split as about fifty/fifty. See JERRY, supra note 61,
§25G, at 157. Ashley finds that a "substantial minority" have rejected the tort claim, see
ASHLEY, supra note 40, § 2:15, at 2-54 to 2-55 & nn.48-61 (citing cases from Florida, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee), and that a "few jurisdictions" have adopted
expanded contract remedies, see id. at 2-53. See also STEMPEL, supra note 40, Ch. 10 (treat-
ing tort theory of recovery as clear majority rule).
83 See ASHLEY, supra note 40, § 2:15, at 2-53, nn.44-47 (citing cases from New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Utah, and Virginia).
84 See id. at 2-57 to 2-58 nn.66-67 (citing statutes from Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island).
85 See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 nn.2-3 (Tex. 1993) (noting that forty-
seven states have recognized the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). This
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and plaintiffs sometimes include such claims along with those more directly for
bad faith.86 Moreover, some states also recognize a claim for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress,87 which plaintiffs also try to use to supplement a
claim for bad faith.88
This combination of uncertainty in the bad faith law and its overlap with
emotional distress torts makes it difficult to be precise about the extent to
which jurisdictions allow emotional distress damages for bad faith conduct. In
an effort to simplify the analysis, I will not consider the separate torts of inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Intentional infliction is gen-
erally limited to outrageous conduct that causes severe distress,89 which will
make it unavailable in all but the most severe insurance bad faith cases.9 ° Neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress does not require outrageous conduct, and
therefore would more readily permit emotional distress damages than the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.91 Only a limited number of states
have adopted that tort, however, and even where the tort has been adopted,
courts have refused to apply it to insurer misconduct for various reasons.92
tort has been recognized in the Restatement as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965). For a more general discussion, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54, at 364-65, nn.57-61; id. § 122, at 901-05 (5th ed.
1984).
86 See, e.g., Everett Assoc., Inc. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Cal.
2001); Lewis v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 978 (E.D. Wis. 2000); Fletcher v.
W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970); Roper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 958 P.2d 1145 (Idaho 1998); McKelvy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 983 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1998); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 429 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 2001); Richardson v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 984 P.2d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
87 See generally Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 1247
(1995); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 85, § 54, at 361-62.
88 See, e.g., Everett, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1196; Acquista v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 730 N.Y.S.2d
272 (App. Div. 2001); Sandman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 969 P.2d 277 (Mont. 1998); Kirk-
wood v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 937 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1997).
89 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
90 For examples of cases finding that an insurer's bad faith conduct was insufficient to meet
the requirements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Metro. Life Insurance Co.
v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985); Roberts v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 374
N.W.2d 905 (Mich. 1985), and Cunningham v. Security Mutual Insurance Co., 689
N.Y.S.2d 290 (App. Div. 1999).
1 The elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress vary from state to state, but for
the tort of negligence, intentional, outrageous conduct is generally not required. See, e.g.,
Hancock v. Northcutt, 808 P.2d 251, 257 (Alaska 1991); Duke v. Cochise County, 938 P.2d
84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Christensen v. Sup. Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 203 (Cal. 1991). For a
description of the various approaches to negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Sandor
& Berry, supra note 87, at 1260-68.
92 For examples of cases finding that an insurer's bad faith conduct was insufficient to meet
the requirements of negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Deno v. Transamerica Title
Insurance Co., 617 P.2d 35 (Ariz. 1980) (inadequate allegations of physical injury or bad
state of mind), Lee v. Travelers, 252 Cal. Rptr. 468 (Ct. App. 1988) (absence of duty), and
Jarvis v. Prudential Insurance Co., 448 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1982) (claims limited to bad faith
breach of contract).
For a general discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Sandor &
Berry, supra note 87.
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In those cases considering emotional distress damages for insurance bad
faith claims, courts have taken six different approaches. At one end of the
spectrum, courts allow emotional distress damages as a routine part of compen-
satory tort damages. 93 At the other end of the spectrum, courts reject emotional
distress damages as beyond the scope of permissible contract damages. 94 In
between these two extremes are three compromise approaches. Some courts
allow emotional distress damages if the plaintiff has other exceptional damages
such as significant property or economic losses.95 Other courts allow emo-
tional distress damages if the defendant has exceptional culpability, such as
malice or other bad state of mind that would justify punitive damages.9 6 A
third compromise approach is used by some courts that reject the tort theory of
bad faith, and permits emotional distress damages as part of contract damages
if the facts show them to be sufficiently foreseeable. 97 Outside of this spectrum
of approaches is a sixth approach allowing emotional distress damages for a
9 See Chavers v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d I (Ala. 1981); Farr v. Transamer-
ica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co.,
878 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo. 1994); Gibson v. W. Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725 (Mont. 1984);
Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991); Smith v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 294 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1980); Coble v. Bowers, 809 P.2d 69 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990);
Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Vandiver, 970 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App. 1998).
14 See Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254 (Del. 1995); Kewin v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1980); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co.,
392 A.2d 576, 581-82 (N.H. 1978); DiBlasi v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d 187
(App. Div. 1989); Farris v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015 (Ore. 1978).
95 See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1041-42 (Cal. 1973) (holding
allegation of substantial loss of property was sufficient to permit consideration of emotional
distress damages); Maxwell v. Fire Ins. Exch., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 869 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding economic loss is a "condition precedent to the recovery of emotional distress dam-
ages in a bad faith case"); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 768 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that "damages for emotional distress may properly be awarded upon a
showing of substantial property or economic loss"); Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271
N.W.2d 368, 896 (Wisc. 1978) (holding that emotional distress damages are available "only
when the distress is severe and substantial other damage is suffered apart from the loss of the
contract benefits and the emotional distress"); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader,
882 P.2d 813, 833 (Wyo. 1994) (holding that to recover emotional distress damages the
plaintiff must have "suffered substantial other damages, such as economic loss, in addition to
the emotional distress").
96 See, e.g., Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816, 819 (Fla. 1976); Saltmarsh
v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 344 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977); Pickett v.
Lloyd's, 621 A.2d 445, 455 (N.J. 1993).
97 See, e.g., Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905, n.5 (Mich. 1985) (noting
that recovery for emotional distress damages "is nevertheless permissible if such damages
can 'reasonably be said to have been in contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
was made'"); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) (noting that "in
unusual cases, damages for mental anguish might be provable").
These statements are clearly dicta, and my research had not discovered any case holding
that emotional distress damages are available under a contract theory for bad faith. The
closest cases are Hall v. Citizens Insurance Co., 368 N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) and
Horton v. Gem Insurance Co., 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Both of these cases
affirm what may be emotional distress damages, but their procedural posture makes them of
dubious precedential value. In Hall, the insurer failed to object to jury instructions that
could be read as permitting recovery for mental anguish. Hall, 368 N.W.2d at 253. In
Horton, the court affirmed the award of $5000 in unspecified compensatory damages
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statutory cause of action based on conduct that would otherwise be considered
bad faith.
98
Although this variety of approaches makes accurate generalizations diffi-
cult, several interesting patterns emerge:
" The most common approach is the most permissive one. Courts from nine states
allow emotional distress damages as a routine part of damages for bad faith. 99
• The majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue allow emotional distress damages
under some circumstances. In addition to the nine states that generally allow emo-
tional distress damages, another seven states allow them if the plaintiff has substan-
tial other harm (three states),' ° ° if the defendant has a bad state of mind (two
states),10 1 or if such damages are within the scope of foreseeable damages (two
states). 102
* A minority of states has rejected the availability of emotional distress damages
outright.
10 3
because the insurer failed to provide an adequate record for review. Horton, 794 P.2d at
849.
98 See, e.g., Time Ins. Co. v. Burger 712 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1998) (holding that emotional
distress damages are available under a statute authorizing first-party bad faith claim against a
health insurer).
99 Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and Texas. See supra note 93.
l1t California, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See supra note 95. One state, Colorado, has
authority that requires substantial property or economic loss as a precondition to emotional
distress damages, see Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 768 P.2d 1243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988),
but also has authority that allows emotional distress damages generally, see Ballow v.
PHICO Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo. 1994). For purposes of these generalizations, I
included Colorado as a state in the most liberal category.
101 Florida and New Jersey. See supra note 96.
102 Michigan and Utah. See supra note 97.
103 The number of states which have rejected emotional distress damages is between four
and six. Only four states - Delaware, New Hampshire, New York and Oregon - have
rejected emotional distress damages unequivocally. See Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254 (Del. 1995); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581-
82 (N.H. 1978); DiBlasi v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93 (N.Y. 1989); Farris v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1978). Another three states - Michigan, New
Jersey, and Utah - have rejected emotional distress damages, but in dicta have stated that
such damages would be permissible under some circumstances. In Michigan, such damages
may be available if the facts show they "can 'reasonably be said to have been in contempla-
tion of the parties at the time the contract was made.'" Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
374 N.W.2d 905, 907 n.5 (Mich. 1985). Similarly, in Utah consequential damages are those
"reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties," and may
include emotional distress damages in "unusual cases." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701
P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) (noting that "in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish might
be provable"). In New Jersey, emotional distress damages are treated similar to punitive
damages and are only available in "egregious circumstances." Pickett v. Lloyd's, 621 A.2d
445, 455 (N.J. 1993).
Although the statements made by the supreme courts in Michigan and Utah were
clearly dicta, two appellate court opinions affirm damages awards that appear for emotional
distress, though both arise out of procedural postures that undercut the strength of those
holdings. See supra note 97 (discussing Hall and Horton).
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B. Crisci's Contribution
The doctrinal uncertainty of first-party bad faith and the related availabil-
ity of emotional distress damages makes it harder to gauge Crisci's contribu-
tion, but it is nonetheless clear that Crisci played a major role in the
development of the law regarding emotional distress damages in bad faith
cases. Crisci's influence was both direct and indirect. It directly influenced
development of the doctrine by providing legal authority for courts adopting a
rule allowing emotional distress damages, or, in some cases, by providing
authority for the case upon which a present case relied in adopting the rule. In
addition, Crisci indirectly influenced the development of the doctrine by pro-
viding a context for consideration of the issues. This context sometimes
resulted in the adoption of a compromise approach to emotional distress
damages.
1. Direct Influence
A good example of the direct influence of Crisci resulting in the adoption
of the most liberal approach to emotional distress damages is the case Farr v.
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co."'o In that case, the plaintiffs
alleged that their insurer had improperly failed to pay benefits due under a
group health insurance policy. The jury awarded $13,117.20 in compensatory
damages, and $70,000 in punitive damages, even though the unpaid benefits
were only $ 2848.45.115 On appeal, the insurer claimed that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury that it was entitled to award plaintiffs compensation
for their emotional distress." 6 The court of appeals rejected that argument and
affirmed the damages instruction:
We conclude that damages for emotional distress may be awarded even though the
defendant did not intentionally cause the distress and even though the distress was
not severe. The concern in a bad faith case is "with mental distress resulting from a
substantial invasion of property interests of the insured and not with the independent
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress." The primary reason for preclud-
ing recovery of mental distress damages "is that to permit recovery of such damages
would open the door to fictitious claims." In the case of bad faith, however, "where
... the claim is actionable and has resulted in substantial damages apart from those
due to mental distress, the danger of fictitious claims is reduced .... " The rationale
for allowing damages for emotional distress without a showing of outrageous con-
duct or severe distress, once a loss of property is proven, is sound. 10 7
Crisci also directly influenced the development of the law through other
cases. In Braesch v. Union Insurance Co., 1 8 for instance, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that mental distress damages are available for the tort of
104 Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
105 Id. at 378-79.
"o "The trial court instructed the jury that it could award damages for the [plaintiffs'] anxi-
ety, emotional distress and embarrassment." Id. at 382. The insurer claimed that plaintiffs
were only entitled to such an instruction if there was evidence of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and outrageous conduct. Id.
107 Id. (citations omitted). Several other cases similarly follow Crisci. See Gibson v. W.
Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725 (Mont. 1984); Smith v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d
751 (N.D. 1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813 (Wyo. 1994).
108 Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991).
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bad faith.109 Even though the court did not cite to Crisci, the cases it relied
upon included two that can be traced back to Crisci. The Nebraska Supreme
Court relied upon Chavers v. National Security Fire & Casualty Co., 1" Rawl-
ings v. Apodaca, I and Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance Co. 112 Although Cha-
vers does not trace directly back to Crisci, 1 3 both Rawlings and Bibeault do.
The Rawlings opinion relied upon Farr,"4 discussed above, and Bibeault
relied upon Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.," 5 which relied upon
Crisci. 
116
In these two examples, the courts followed Crisci and adopted the most
liberal approach to emotional distress damages. Crisci also directly influenced
the adoption of the compromise approach that requires substantial other dam-
ages as a precondition to emotional distress damages. This has been the
approach of the California courts following Crisci.1 7 An example of a court
following Crisci for this approach outside of California is Farmers Group v.
Trimble.1 8 That case was an appeal from a decision after a remand to address
i'9 Id. at 778.
'10 Chavers v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981).
"' Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986).
112 Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980).
"3 In dicta and without citation to authority, the Alabama Supreme Court observed: "The
elements of the tort of bad faith may be proved, as with other intentional torts, by circum-
stantial as well as direct evidence. Recoverable damages may include mental distress and
economic loss." Chavers, 405 So. 2d at 7.
114 See Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 376, 377 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985). The court also relied upon 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 11 (1988) and RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977). Id.
1 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977). Relying on Christian, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reasoned: "Since violation of this duty sounds in contract as well as in tort, the insured may
obtain consequential damages for economic loss and emotional distress and, when appropri-
ate, punitive damages." Bibeault, 417 A.2d at 319. Although the court did not rely on
Crisci for this point, it did cite to Crisci in another part of the opinion. See id. (noting that
courts recognized a "well-established duty of an insurer in the context of liability insurance
to act reasonably and in good faith in settling third-party claims against insureds").
116 After quoting an extensive passage from Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 510 P.2d
1032 (Cal. 1973), that relied upon Crisci, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: "We approve
and adopt the rule that an insurer has an implied duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with
its insured and that the violation of this duty gives rise to an action in tort for which conse-
quential and, in a proper case, punitive, damages may be sought." Christian, 577 P.2d at
904. It should be noted that Christian did not address the issue of emotional distress dam-
ages, but has been construed to have included such damages as part of general tort damages.
See Coble v. Bowers, 809 P.2d 69, 73 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that "emotional dis-
tress caused by a willful, actionable tort is recoverable, even absent physical injury, if it is
the natural and probable consequence of the tortious act" and that "[m]ental distress is recog-
nized as an ordinary and natural result of a failure of insurance").
117 See, e.g., Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 374, 378 (Cal. 1991);
Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1041; Maxwell v. Fire Ins. Exch., 60 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1450 (Ct.
App. 1998); Waters v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1063, 1073 (Ct. App. 1996).
However, there is some California authority that might support the more liberal
approach to emotional distress damages. See, e.g., Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d
1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974) ("Violation of the duty of the insurer sounds in tort, we held, and an
insured may recover for all detriment resulting from such violation, including mental
distress.").
118 Farmers Group v. Trimble, 768 P.2d 1243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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a bad faith counterclaim. The jury awarded $170,000 in compensatory dam-
ages," 9 and the insurer appealed, arguing that emotional distress damages
should not have been awarded because the plaintiff failed to prove intent to
cause severe emotional distress.12 0 In affirming the award, the court adopted a
formulation nearly identical to that of the California Supreme Court in Crisci.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded: "emotional distress is recoverable
as an element of damages in an action for bad faith breach of insurance contract
when the emotional distress results from substantial property or economic loss
proximately caused by the insurer's conduct."1 21
2. Indirect Influence
In addition to providing authority to rely upon, Crisci also provided a
context for addressing the request for emotional distress damages. Some courts
that chose not to follow Crisci responded to its approach and reasoning by
adopting a compromise approach to emotional distress damages.
One example of a compromise approach adopted in partial response to
Crisci is the case of Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.,122 decided by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1978. In that case, the court held that policy-
holders had a tort claim against their insurer for bad faith refusal to pay a claim
owing under a homeowners policy.' 23 Although it did not specifically address
the availability of emotional distress damages in the claim before it, the court
made some general comments about emotional distress damages in bad faith
cases.124 In the course of these comments, the court noted that two California
cases12 5 (which relied upon Crisci 126) considered emotional distress damages
appropriate where the plaintiffs suffered substantial damages beyond simple
breach of the contract. The court rejected this approach, however, and con-
cluded: "[a] recovery for emotional distress caused by an insurer's bad faith
119 Id. at 1245.
120 Id. at 1246.
121 Id. The key passage in Crisci was:
We are satisfied that a plaintiff who as a result of a defendant's tortious conduct loses his prop-
erty and suffers mental distress may recover not only for the pecuniary loss but also for his
mental distress. No substantial reason exists to distinguish the cases which have permitted
recovery for mental distress in actions for invasion of property rights. The principal reason for
limiting recovery of damages for mental distress is that to permit recovery of such damages
would open the door to fictitious claims, to recovery for mere bad manners, and to litigation in
the field of trivialities. Obviously, where, as here, the claim is actionable and has resulted in
substantial damages apart from those due to mental distress, the danger of fictitious claims is
reduced, and we are not here concerned with mere bad manners or trivialities but tortious con-
duct resulting in substantial invasions of clearly protected interests.
Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (citation omitted).
122 Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
123 See id. at 371.
124 See id. at 378. Although these comments were clearly dicta, they have become the law
in Wisconsin. See, e.g., Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 342 N.W.2d 699, 702 n.2 (Wis. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Estate of
Plautz by Pagel v. Time Ins. Co., 525 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
125 The court cited Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973), and
Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co., 521 P.2d 1103 (Cal. 1974). See Anderson, 271
N.W.2d at 378.
126 See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1041; Silberg, 521 P.2d at 1108-09.
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refusal to pay an insured's claim should be allowed only when the distress is
severe and substantial other damage is suffered apart from the loss of the con-
tract benefits and the emotional distress."' 127
Another example can be seen in the case of Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange,' 2 8 where the Utah Supreme Court recognized a claim for bad faith,
but one that was founded on contract rather than tort.' 29 Although the contract
approach in some jurisdictions precludes the award of emotional distress dam-
ages," 3 the Utah Supreme Court went out of its way to explain that contract
damages could include emotional distress damages. The court noted that con-
tract damages include those which are foreseeable, and that "it is axiomatic that
insurance frequently is purchased not only to provide funds in case of loss, but
to provide peace of mind." 13 1 The court concluded: "we find no difficulty
with the proposition that, in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish might
be provable."' 132
In reaching this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court relied upon the dis-
sent of Justice Williams in Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. 133 The majority in that case held that a policy holder could not recover
emotional distress damages for an insurer's failure to pay disability benefits
due under an insurance policy.134 The dissent argued that emotional distress
damages should be available even under a contract theory so long as those
damages were within the scope of foreseeability. 135 Justice Williams noted
that other jurisdictions permitted emotional distress damages, and cited Crisci
in support. 1
36
This discussion has shown that Crisci had substantial influence, both
direct and indirect, on the development of the law concerning emotional dis-
tress damages for insurance bad faith conduct. It provided authority for cases
to allow emotional distress damages. Although some cases carefully followed
Crisci's requirement for substantial property or economic damages as a precon-
dition to emotional distress damages, others went further than Crisci and made
such damages more generally available. In addition, Crisci provided a legal
context to which other courts responded. That context encouraged some courts
to concede that even if emotional distress damages were not generally availa-
ble, under some circumstances they should be available even using a breach of
contract theory for bad faith claims.
127 Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 378.
128 Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
129 Id. at 798-99.
130 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
131 Beck, 701 P.2d at 802.
132 Id.
133 Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 64-72 (Mich. 1980) (Williams, J.,
dissenting). The Utah Supreme Court's reliance can be found in Beck v. Farmer's Insurance
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985).
134 Kewin, 295 N.W.2d at 55.
135 Id. at 62-64.
136 Id. at 64-65.
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IV. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
Although Crisci has had a significant influence on the availability of emo-
tional distress damages, it still has the potential for further influence. By my
count, only twenty states have addressed the issue of emotional distress dam-
ages for insurance bad faith claims,' 37 leaving the issue open in a majority of
states. In addition, the doctrine may continue to evolve in the twenty states that
have addressed the issue. Courts in those states may clarify the law or choose
to limit previous decisions as mere dicta.138 Furthermore, courts taking con-
servative approaches to emotional distress damages in first party cases may
choose to take a more liberal approach in cases involving third-party bad faith.
Most of the cases decided after Crisci addressing the emotional distress issue
involve first party insurance, which is less likely to give rise to a tort claim for
bad faith. As a result, emotional distress damages are less likely to be awarded.
But because third-party bad faith is generally regarded as a tort,139 those juris-
dictions limiting emotional distress damages for first-party bad faith may
choose to allow them in the third-party context.
Because the law is not yet settled on this issue, I take this opportunity to
make normative arguments in support of emotional distress damages. I believe
that Crisci correctly decided to permit emotional distress damages, but that it
should not have limited such damages to cases where the plaintiff has substan-
tial property or economic damages. In other words, I endorse the most liberal
approach for emotional distress damages in bad faith cases and maintain that
they should be routinely available. Crisci's limitation on emotional distress
damages was probably the product of an effort to fit emotional distress dam-
ages within the existing doctrinal framework. Although California courts con-
tinue to limit the availability of emotional distress damages to some degree,"
other jurisdictions that initially followed Crisci have subsequently dropped the
limitation,' 4 ' which I support as the optimum approach.
A. Emotional Distress Damages Should Be Permitted to Compensate
Victims
Emotional distress damages should be routinely available in bad faith
cases to provide full compensation to the plaintiff. This is true regardless of
137 See supra notes 99-103. Getting an accurate count is complicated by the fact that emo-
tional distress damages might be permitted in a bad faith case under either the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, or perhaps even as part of a negligence claim. See
supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
138 For examples of statements of dicta, see supra notes 103 and 113.
139 See supra note 69.
140 See supra note 117.
14' For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals initially followed Crisci quite literally. See
Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 768 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
"damages for emotional distress may properly be awarded upon a showing of substantial
property or economic loss"). However, the Colorado Supreme Court characterized the rule
more liberally. See Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo. 1994) (stating that
"an insured suing under the tort of bad faith breach of an insurance contract is entitled to
recover damages based upon traditional tort principles of compensation for injuries actually
suffered, including emotional distress").
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whether you use a tort or contract theory for bad faith. Under tort theory, dam-
ages are supposed to fully compensate the victim for damages caused by the
tort. 14 2 Under contract theory, damages are to put the party in the position he
or she would have been if the contract had not been breached. 143 Both of these
theories justify emotional distress damages for bad faith breach of an insurance
policy. It is generally recognized that people buy insurance for "peace of
mind."' 44 As a result, when an insurer in bad faith fails to live up to the obliga-
tions under an insurance policy, it is foreseeable that instead of peace of mind,
the policyholder will suffer mental distress.' 4 5 This mental distress is just as
much a part of the policyholder's damages as is pain and suffering for the
victim of a personal injury tort, 146 or lost profits for the victim of a breach of
142 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1977) ("the law of torts
attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to
his position prior to the tort."); id. § 903 cmt. a ("compensatory damages are designed to
place him in a position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would
have occupied had no tort been committed"); Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 982 (Cal.
1999).
143 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Ch. 16, topic 2 Introductory Cmt.
(1979) ("[T]he initial assumption is that the injured party is entitled to full compensation for
his actual loss."); id. § 347 cmt. a (1979) ("[C]ontract damages are ordinarily based on the
injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of his bargain by
awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract been performed."); Reynolds Metals Co. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 758 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1985); Nat'l Chain Co. v. Campbell, 487 A.2d
132, 135 (R.I. 1985) ("[T]he underlying rationale in breach-of-contract actions is to place
the innocent party in the position in which he would have been if the contract had been fully
performed."). This basic approach goes back to the historic case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341,156 Eng. Rep. 145 (K.B. 1854).
" See, e.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 n.3 (Ariz. 1986); Tan Jay Int'l Ltd. v.
Canadian Indem. Co., 243 Cal. Rptr. 907, 912 (Ct. App. 1988); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas.
Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 152 (Kan. 1980); Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.
2d 1172, 1179 n.9 (Miss. 1990); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985).
For examples of articles recognizing the importance of peace of mind, see Douglas R. Rich-
mond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries To Their Insureds, 88 Ky. L.J. 1, 4 (2000);
Karon 0. Bowdre, "Litigation Insurance": Consequences Of An Insurance Company's
Wrongful Refusal To Defend, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 743, 745-46 (1996); Mary Elizabeth Phe-
lan, The First Party Dilemma: Bad Faith or Bad Business?, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 1031, 1035-
36 (1985-86); David Tartaglio, Note, The Expectation of Peace of Mind: A Basis for Recov-
ery of Damages for Mental Suffering Resulting from the Breach of First Party Insurance
Contracts, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (1983).
145 One commentator argued that the wrongful denial of benefits is similar to the sixteenth
most stressful event on the Social Readjustment Rating Scale, one place ahead of death of a
close friend. Tartaglio, supra note 144, at 1364-65. The original authors of APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE go a little further, contending that the emotional distress
from wrongful denial of insurance benefits is similar to the shock of learning that one's
spouse and children have been killed in an automobile accident. 16A J. APPLEMAN & J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8879 (1981).
146 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903, cmt. a (1977) ("[T]he sensations
caused by harm to the body or by pain or humiliation are not in any way analogous to a
pecuniary loss, and a sum of money is not the equivalent of peace of mind. Nevertheless,
damages given for pain and humiliation are called compensatory. They give to the injured
person some pecuniary return for what he has suffered or is likely to suffer."); Hoskie v.
United States, 666 F.2d 1353, 1357 (8th Cir. 1981); Hancey v. United States, 967 F. Supp.
443, 445 (D. Colo. 1997); Grammer v. Kohlhaas Tank & Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 823, 833
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contract. 14 7 Depriving most or all bad faith victims of emotional distress dam-
ages therefore leaves victims with inadequate compensation.' 4 8
B. Criticisms of Emotional Distress Damages Do Not Apply to the
Circumstances of Insurance Bad Faith
A number of arguments have traditionally been used to justify depriving
victims of emotional distress damages, but those arguments are inapplicable in
the context of insurance bad faith claims. Perhaps most significant of these
arguments has been a concern about false and marginal claims.14 9 To prevent
such claims, tort doctrine has traditionally required that victims have some
physical harm or impact as a precondition to emotional distress damages.1 50
This requirement ensures that only those who have suffered some real damage
can also claim the more ephemeral damages due to emotional distress.
1 5 1
Although bad faith victims may not have the traditional physical harm or
impact, if they have a claim for bad faith they will have economic damages that
will limit recoveries to those who suffer "real" damage. In the case of third-
party insurance, this economic damage typically takes the form of a judgment
over the policy limits, while in first-party cases it is in the form of a delay or
wrongful denial of insurance benefits. In either case the insurer has the ability
to avoid the potential for false or marginal claims by simply avoiding bad faith
conduct.
(N.M. Ct. App. 1979). For a general discussion of pain and suffering damages, see Steven P.
Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Dam-
ages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995).
147 See, e.g., Guard v. P & R Enter., Inc., 631 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1981); S. Jon Kreedman &
Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-W. Corp., 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1976); Sharick v. S.E.
Univ. of Health Sci., Inc. 780 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Ramirez, J., concurring)
("[T]he modem trend is to allow recovery for such lost profits if they can be proven with
reasonable certainty") (quoting Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. N.W. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d
1235 (Ariz. 1984)); Crawford & Assoc. v. Groves-Keen, Inc., 194 S.E.2d 499, 501 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972); Fera v. Vill. Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372 (Mich. 1976); Cardinal Consulting Co.
v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1980); Brenneman v. Auto-Teria, Inc., 491
P.2d 992 (Or. 1971); Wyo. Bancorporation v. Bonham, 563 P.2d 1382 (Wyo. 1977). Such
damages, of course, are not available if they are speculative. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979).
148 A number of others have made a similar argument for compensation. See, e.g., Tartag-
lio, supra note 144; Linda Curtis, Note, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of
Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161, 165 (1986). Some authors have
made the argument about emotional distress damages more generally. See, e.g., Sandor &
Berry, supra note 87; Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 152 (1992);
Barry Peristein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An Economic Argument for the
Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of Contract, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 877, 881 (1992); Douglas J. Whaley, Paying For The Agony: The Recovery
of Emotional Distress Damages In Contract Actions, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 940 n.67
(1992). For examples of cases that have used this rationale, see Crisci v. Security Insurance
Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178-79 (Cal. 1967); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 778
(Neb. 1991).
49 See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179 (citing PROSSER, TORTS § 11, at 43 (3d ed. 1964); Sandor &
Berry, supra note 87, at 1253-55.
150 See Sandor & Berry, supra note 87, at 1260-62.
151 See id.
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Because even the most liberal approach would limit emotional distress
damages to those who have suffered other bad faith damages, I believe that the
real concern behind courts' reluctance to allow such damages is the total expo-
sure faced by the insurance industry. In other words, instead of being worried
about false or marginal claims, I suspect that courts are really worried about the
number of potential claims, the associated amount of damages, and perhaps the
risk of exaggerated damages. 152 To put it bluntly, courts are concerned that
routinely allowing emotional distress damages would add tens of thousands of
dollars in damages to thousands of cases, which in turn would increase the cost
of insurance for all policyholders. 15 3 While this might be justified in the case
of "hard" or "real" damages, emotional distress damages are sufficiently
ephemeral that courts are concerned that juries, which are viewed as being sub-
ject to emotional influence, may award more in excessive damages in too many
cases.
Even assuming that juries will award excessive amounts for emotional dis-
tress, however, this concern does not justify limiting such damages in light of
the circumstances of bad faith litigation. The concern about the total amount of
emotional distress damages presumes that they will be awarded in most bad
faith cases. In reality, however, the total number of bad faith cases that will
reach judgment or even settlement probably represents only a small fraction of
instances in which bad faith conduct has occurred. There are several reasons
for this. First, many, if not most, policyholders are likely to be unaware of the
full scope of their legal rights. 154 Second, many, if not most, insurance claims
are likely to be for amounts that are so small that the costs and risks of litiga-
tion outweigh the potential returns. 15 5 Third, insurance companies have much
greater litigation resources and are in a substantially better position to bear the
152 See id. at 1256-57.
153 Cf Erlich v. Menezes, 981 P.2d 978, 988 (Cal. 1999) (noting that allowing emotional
distress damages for construction defects would increase the cost of housing and affect the
availability of insurance); Sandor & Berry, supra note 87, at 1256 (noting that courts'
concern that allowing emotional distress damages generally "would give rise to potentially
limitless claims").
"I Although I do not have specific empirical data to support this belief, empirical data
shows that policyholders often misunderstand basic insurance coverages and exclusions. See
Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 319-23 (1998). If policyholders are mistaken about their rights speci-
fied in their insurance policies, it seems likely that they would be unaware of legal rights that
are based on common law developments.
155 For example, a comprehensive, national study of automobile injury claims found that
ninety-two percent of bodily injury claimants (35,716 out of a total of 38,701) had economic
losses of $5000 or less. Less than one percent of bodily injury claimants (358 out of 38,701)
had economic losses over $50,000. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, INJURIES IN AUTO
ACCIDENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF AUTO INSURANCE CLAIMS 51 (1999) (data from Figure 5-7).
A similar, though somewhat less stark, distribution was found for Personal Injury Protection
claims: seventy-nine percent of PIP claimants (15,277 of 19,274) had economic losses of
$5000 or less, while less than one percent (168 out of 19,274) had economic losses over
$50,000. Id. Many other tort claims are also abandoned or resolved prior to litigation. See
Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1099-101
(1996).
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risks of litigation.'5 6 As a result, it is likely that insurers will be able to settle
most bad faith cases at a discount from their full litigation value. 157
C. A Simple Quantitative Model for Evaluating the Impact of Allowing
Emotional Distress Damages
Although quantifying the effect of these factors would require substantial
empirical research, estimates of their impact can be used to illustrate that the
concern about overpayment for emotional distress damages is greatly exagger-
ated. Let us work with the following simplistic model. Assume that fifty per-
cent of policyholders are aware of their rights, and that of those, another fifty
percent have damages that are sufficient to justify the expense, hassle, and risks
of bringing a legal action. In addition, assume that seventy-five percent of
cases involve insufficient damages to warrant making a legal claim. We will
also assume that of those who bring a legal action, ninety percent will compro-
mise their claim prior to trial, 58 and that the compromise will be for eighty
percent of the full value of the case. For simplicity, we will assume bad faith
claims not worth bringing as lawsuits on average cause $1000 in non-emotional
distress damages, but that ones worth bringing cause $50,000 in such damages.
We will also assume that emotional distress damages will, on average, be fifty
percent of compensatory damages when they are accurate, but when "exagger-
ated" we will assume that they will, on average, be two times the compensatory
damages (or four times higher than when not exaggerated).159 Finally, let's
work with these assumptions in a set of 1000 bad faith incidents.
156 See, e.g., Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 775 (Neb. 1991); Bibeault v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 318 (R.I. 1980).
157 The conventional wisdom is that "about ninety percent of civil cases settle before trial."
William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case For Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
367, 370 (1999); see also Mary J. Davis, Summary Adjudication Methods in United States
Civil Procedure, 46 AM. J. Comp. L. 229, 229 n.2 (1998). Statistics confirm this number.
For examples, only 4.9% of tort cases filed in federal court (139 of a total of 2,821) were
resolved during or after trial. See Table C-4 Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action
Taken, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (2000), available at http:/l
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/contents.html. For a more comprehensive discussion of the
settlement data, and lack thereof, along with a more complete picture of how tort claims are
resolved, see Galanter, supra, note 155.
158 See supra note 157.
159 There is no comprehensive database of emotional distress damages in bad faith cases.
Reported appellate decisions of bad faith cases show a substantial range of possible emo-
tional distress damages. Sometimes they are a proportion of other compensatory damages.
See, e.g., Berglund v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1997)
(plaintiffs awarded $515,831.42 for an excess judgment and interest and $4000 for emotional
distress); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 175 (Cal. 1967) ($25,000 in emotional dis-
tress damages compared to $91,000 in other compensatory damages); Waller v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 697 (Ct. App. 1994) (plaintiff awarded emotional distress dam-
ages of $250,000 and other compensatory damages of $705,461.53); Bibeault v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 315 (R.I. 1980) (plaintiff awarded $15,000 for uninsured-motorist
benefits and another $20,000 in compensatory damages that included emotional distress).
On the other hand, sometimes emotional distress damages are substantially greater than other
compensatory damages by as much as a factor of four or five. See, e.g., Ace v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff awarded $ 27,009 for the wrongful
denial of disability benefits and $100,000 for emotional distress); Clayton v. United Servs.
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Using these assumptions, of the 1000 incidents of bad faith, 500 will not
be brought because policyholders are unaware of their rights. Of the remaining
500 incidents, 375 do not involve sufficient damages to warrant legal action.
That leaves 125 incidents for which suits are filed, of which only 13 proceed to
trial. The following table provides a summary:
TABLE 1 - BAD FAITH INCIDENTS PROCEEDING TO SETTLEMENT OR TRIAL
Incidents Knowledge Size of claim Compromise
13 to trial
125 large
500 known 112 settled
375 small
1000 500 unknown
Now to calculate damages. Under the above assumptions, bad faith
occurred in each of the 1000 incidents. In 750 incidents (seventy-five percent),
the real damages were only $1000, amounting to a total of $750,000 for those
incidents. In the remaining 250 incidents, the damages were $50,000, for a
total of $12,500,000 for those incidents. The combined total for non-emotional
distress damages in all 1000 cases therefore is $13,250,000. Based on our
assumption that emotional distress damages will add another fifty percent, the
emotional distress damages for all 1000 incidents would come to $6,625,000.
The combined total of both emotional distress and non-emotional distress dam-
ages comes to $19,875,000. The following table provides a summary:
TABLE 2 - TOTAL DAMAGES FROM 1,000 BAD FAITH INCIDENTS
Non-Emotional Emotional
Incidents Size of claim Distress Damages Distress Damages Total Damages
750 small $ 750,000 $ 375,000 $ 1,125,000
1000
250 large $12,500,000 $6,250,000 $18,750,000
Totals 1000 cases $13,250,000 $6,625,000 $19,875,000
Auto. Ass'n, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 420 (Ct. App. 1997) (plaintiff awarded $429,310 in
compensatory damages of which $400,000 was allotted to emotional distress); Kewin v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Mich. 1980) (reversing jury's decision to
award $75,000 in emotional distress damages in addition to $16,500 due under the insurance
policy); Gibson v. W. Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725, 729-30 (Mont. 1984) (plaintiff awarded
damages of $250,000 of which $83,750 was for the excess verdict).
The assumptions used for this simple quantitative model are a generalized average of
these outcomes, somewhat discounted by the fact that the higher the emotional distress dam-
ages, the more likely it is to be appealed and therefore the less likely it is to be representative
of average verdicts. This methodology is my best estimate, though I recognize it is far from
scientific. Good data on the size of emotional distress damage awards in bad faith cases
obviously could change the outcomes from the model. My point, however, is not to prove
that emotional distress damages would not be excessive, but rather that the risk of excessive
damages should be discounted by the fact that many claims will not be brought and the fact
that of those cases that are brought, most will be compromised.
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Not all of these damages would be paid out. Half of the cases will not be
brought because the policyholders are unaware of their rights, and of the
remaining, only twenty-five percent of the cases are large enough to justify the
expense of making a legal claim. Of the 1000 incidents, only 125 of the large
claims will be brought. These cases have non-economic damages of $50,000
and emotional distress damages of $25,000, for a total of $75,000 per case.
The total damages for all 125 cases amounts to $9,375,000. But this figure is
more than what will be paid out because most cases will be settled. Of the 125
cases, 112 (ninety percent) will be settled at an average cost of $60,000 (eighty
percent of full value). The settled cases have a combined cost of $6,720,000.
The remaining cases (thirteen) that go to trial have the cost of $75,000 per case,
for a total of $975,000. The combined total cost for settled and tried cases is
$7,695,000. Table 3 provides a summary:
TABLE 3 - TOTAL COSTS FOR BAD FAITH CASES SETTLED OR TRIED
Non-Emotional Emotional
Incidents Compromised Distress Damages Distress Damages Total Damages
13 tried $ 650,000 $ 325,000 $ 975,000
125
1 112 settled $4,480,000 $2,240,000 $6,720,000
Totals 125 cases $5,130,000 $2,565,000 $7,695,000
These figures show that making insurers liable for emotional distress dam-
ages will not result in any overpayment of damages. For 1000 incidents of bad
faith conduct, the insurer would make total payments of $7,695,000. This total
is $12,180,000 less than the actual damages of $19,875,000. Moreover, the
insurers total payment is $5,550,000 less than the non-emotional distress dam-
ages in all cases, and is $4,805,000 less than the non-emotional distress dam-
ages in just the large cases. Thus, because of the large number of cases that are
not brought, the cost of bad faith, even with emotional distress damages, is still
substantially less than the damages caused by such conduct. Although our
assumptions may not be accurate, the margin is so large that the probability of
overpayment by insurers is very low. The following table provides the sum-
mary comparison of total cost to total damages:
TABLE 4 - COMPARISON OF TOTAL COSTS TO TOTAL DAMAGES
Total Total Non-Emotional Total N-ED in Large
Total Cost Damages Distress Damages cases
$7,695,000 $19,875,000 $13,250,000 $12,500,000
We now turn to the consideration of exaggerated emotional distress dam-
ages. If we increase the emotional distress damages to two times the non-
emotional distress damages, the margin between damages paid and damages
suffered will be smaller, but not eliminated. The exaggerated emotional dis-
tress damages would only apply to those cases that would be brought, so we
need only work with 125 cases from the 1000 bad faith incidents. The non-
emotional distress damages would be the same, but instead of having $25,000
in emotional distress damages, we now assume that the damages would be two
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times the non-emotional distress damages ($50,000), or $100,000 in each case.
For those thirteen cases that are tried, we assume that full $100,000 would be
paid, which pushes the total emotional distress damages for those cases to
$1,300,000. In addition, the emotional distress damages for the settled cases
would be eighty percent of $100,000 per case, or $80,000. If that amount is
paid in each of the 112 settled cases, the total for those cases comes to
$8,960,000. When combined with the non-emotional distress damages, the
total cost for all 125 cases would be $15,390,000. The following table is a
summary:
TABLE 5 - TOTAL COSTS WITH EXAGGERATED EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS DAMAGES
Non-Emotional Emotional
Incidents Compromised Distress Damages Distress Damages Total Damages
13 tried $ 650,000 $1,300,000 $ 1,950,000
125
112 settled $4,480,000 $8,960,000 $13,440,000
Totals 125 cases $5,130,000 $10,260,000 $15,390,000
Although these numbers are much closer to the actual damages than the
figures without exaggerated emotional distress damages, they are still
$4,485,000 less. In other words, even if emotional distress damages are four
times more than what we assumed for actual damages (so that, on average, they
are two times higher than the non-emotional distress damages), the total cost to
the insurance industry would still be less than the damages caused by bad faith
conduct in our set of 1000 incidents. This, however, assumes that emotional
distress damages are necessary to compensate victims of bad faith. The total
cost of these claims (including exaggerated emotional distress damages)
exceeds the actual damages in all 1000 cases when emotional distress is
entirely excluded from the damages. The exaggerated damages exceed the
non-economic damages for all incidents by $2,140,000, and they exceed the
non-economic damages in large cases by $2,890,000. The relevant figures are
included in the following table:
TABLE 6 - COMPARISON OF TOTAL EXAGGERATED COSTS TO
TOTAL DAMAGES
Total Cost- Total Non-Emotional Total Non-ED in
Exaggerated ED Total Damages Distress Damages Large cases
$15,390,000 $19,875,000 $13,250,000 $12,500,000
Although these are sizeable differences, when exaggerated emotional dis-
tress damages are considered in the context of all claims, they exceed the total
non-emotional distress damages only by a modest proportion. Total costs
including exaggerated emotional distress damages only exceed total non-emo-
tional distress damages by 16.15%,6o and only exceed total non-economic
16 Here is the math: $15,390,000 - $13,250,000 = $2,140,000. $2,140,000 / $13,250,000 =
0.161509434.
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damages for large cases incidents by 23.12%.161 Thus, by exaggerating emo-
tional distress damages by a factor of four, insurers would have to pay less than
twenty-five percent over the non-emotional distress damages caused in the
worst of the 1000 incidents.
This simple quantitative model can be challenged as making incorrect or
unrealistic assumptions, but even with those challenges, it shows that the
impact of emotional distress damages is substantially, if not entirely, offset by
the circumstances of insurance bad faith litigation. Many bad faith cases will
never be brought to court because policyholders are unaware of their legal
rights or because the damages are too small to justify the costs and risks of
litigation. In addition, even when claims are brought, the insurers' comparative
advantages enable them to settle most cases at a discount from their full value.
As a result of these circumstances, insurers would have to consistently pay
grossly exaggerated emotional distress damages before they would end up pay-
ing more in the aggregate than the total damages caused by bad faith
conduct. 1
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V. CONCLUSION
Crisci is a landmark insurance bad faith case. It helped to popularize bad
faith law, and to develop bad faith law. Although not as obvious, Crisci also
initiated a line of cases allowing emotional distress damages for an insurer's
bad faith conduct. In this respect, the influence of Crisci is still ongoing. The
majority of states have not yet addressed whether emotional distress damages
are available for an insurer's bad faith conduct, though many states allow them
under some circumstances. Only a handful of states have directly rejected the
availability of emotional distress damages in bad faith cases. Of those states
that allow emotional distress damages, the most common approach goes further
than Crisci and would allow them as a routine element of damages. Other
states only allow emotional distress damages in more limited bad faith
circumstances.
From a normative standpoint, I have argued that emotional distress dam-
ages should be routinely available in bad faith cases. Insurance policies are
purchased in significant part to obtain "peace of mind." When an insurer acts
in bad faith to deprive a policyholder of benefits due under a policy, emotional
distress is foreseeable and, in many cases, likely. As a result, emotional dis-
tress damages are necessary in many cases to fully compensate policyholders.
The Crisci saga, and its continuing resonance with new generations of law
students, tends to emphasize the reasonableness of the view that emotional
damages recovery is a necessary component of effective insurance law and
regulation.
Continued resistance to emotional distress damages stems from concerns
about an insurance company's ability to pay such damages. Courts are con-
cerned about the number of such claims that would be brought and the possibil-
161 Here is the math: $15,390,000 - $12,500,000 = $2,890,000. $2,890,000 / $12,500,000 =
0.2312.
162 A similar argument, though without the model and based on deterrence concerns, was
made by Curtis, supra note 148.
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ity of false and exaggerated claims. The circumstances of bad faith litigation,
however, show that these concerns are substantially unwarranted. Many bad
faith cases will never be brought to court, and most of those brought will be
compromised through settlement. A simple quantitative model shows that
emotional distress damages are unlikely to overburden insurers. Because so
many claims are never brought, insurers in the aggregate are likely to pay less
than the full cost of bad faith conduct even if emotional distress damages are
consistently grossly exaggerated. The legal system need not wait for more
Crisci cases to recognize the utility of emotional distress damages in our sys-
tem of insurer bad faith law.
